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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On first reading of the briefs in this case, it must appear 
to the reader that the facts are in such violent dispute that the 
reviewing court can scarcely resolve them. 
Such a conclusion would hurt appellants who seek specific 
relief, and must show that the facts clearly justify that relief 
in order to obtain it. Similarly, confusion as to the facts serves 
respondent. 
Appellants contend that if the verbiage is cut through, so 
that the inquiry goes to the factual documentation for statements, 
rather than to the statements themselves, that there is really no 
substantial factual disagreement in these briefs. 
As an example, appellants seek to have the amount, $246,033.08, 
of appellants1 judgment affirmed. 
To counter this, respondents1 brief attacks the amount by 
using emotionally charged words responding to the amount of her 
judgment such as "sham" (Resp. Brief pp. 8, 198, 19, 25, 29, 31), 
"windfall," (Resp. Brief pp. 5, 33), "collusion," (Resp. Brief 
pp. 32, 33, 35), "set-up," (Resp. Brief pp. 6, 23, 30, 35), "con-
trived," (Resp. Brief pp. 12, 18, 20, 22, 25, 29, 31, 33), "exces-
sive," (Resp. Brief pp. 19, 31, 33, 35),and "machination," (Resp. 
Brief pp. 33). 
What documentation does respondent submit to support these 
adjectives? On Mrs. Christiansen's part, she carefully documented 
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medical, earning and pain basis for her damages (App. Brief 12-
14). The basic support was the affidavit of her attending physi-
cian, Dr. Robert Baer (R., 181-186) which detailed her injuries, 
their effect on her ability to work, and her future medical ex-
pense for their treatment. 
Respondent submitted no rebutting medical affidavit at all. 
Clearly, in a personal injury case, the foundation for the 
amount of damages is the amount of physical injury. 
Respondent had the opportunity to submit such documentation. 
It had deposed Dr. Baer, Dr. Burgoyne, head of the chronic pain 
clinic attended by Mrs. Christiansen, had had her independently 
examined by a doctor of respondent's choosing and had her complete 
medical records. 
At pages 7 and 8 of respondent's Brief, numbered paragraphs 
3 and 4, respondent says two doctors take a minimal view of her 
injuries. 
Repondent's counsel are obviously highly skilled. The law 
requiring impeaching material to be in form admissible in evidence 
is rudimentary. Notwithstcinding, there is not a single word from 
either of those doctors or from any medical source in affidavit, 
excerpt from deposition, or transcript/before this court or the 
trial court to support respondent's position in an admissible form. 
One would expect that when a party uses the adjectives used 
by respondent, that party would document them. To repeatedly say 
that the amount of Mrs. Christiansen's judgment is a sham, con-
trived, collusive, etc., is to tar her. That might be justified 
if the facts are clear, but then to fail to support with support-
ing facts is a very questionable procedure. 
From this, it can be inferred that the reason respondent has 
totally failed to document can only be that the documentation does 
not exist. 
In other words, there is no factual dispute properly before 
the court as to the extent of Mrs. Christiansen's injuries. She 
has documented their severity. Respondent has totally failed, 
factually, documentarily, precisely, candidly, to rebut them. 
Verbiage, yes. Facts, no. 
This brings into focus the necessity and purpose of Rule 
75(p)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It provides. 
"If the respondent agrees with the statement of facts 
set forth in appellant's brief, he shall so indicate. 
If he controverts it, he shall state wherein such 
statement is inconsistent with the facts and shall 
make a statement of the facts as he finds them, giv-
ing reference to the pages of the record supporting 
his statement and controverting appellant's statement." 
It should be noted that respondent's brief, in its statement 
of facts, which is partially contained in the formally designated 
statement of facts and also in its argument Point I, does not cotply 
with this rule. It has no designation of the factual statements 
submitted by appellants with which respondent disagrees, nor 
cites to the transcript, so that this court can review points of 
difference, and make an independent determination as to who is 
accurate. 
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Appellants see the law as being essentially at rest, each 
side having submitted law appropriately supporting its factual 
position, with the caveat that appellants argue that even if 
the case be viewed as one of indemnity, the full amount of Mrs. 
Christiansen's judgment is still, under these facts, the proper 
measure of damages, not the $15,000 paid by Holiday. 
Reading these briefs requires the conscious application of 
the phrase "ipse dixit" on an appellate level—is a thing so 
because a person says that it is, or is it so because it is docu-
mented? 
The purpose of this reply brief is to clarify the facts. 
Appellants' approach will be to list the key points of fact, 
as stated by both sides, and compare these to (1) the position of 
the other party on that point and (2) the transcript. 
The factual contentions raised in respondent's brief will 
be considered first. 
IS THE AMOUNT OF APPELLANT PATRICIA CHRISTIANSEN'S JUDGMENT, 
$246,033.08, JUSTIFIED? 
Respondent states in its brief that Mrs. Christiansen's 
$246,033.08 judgment "bears no relation of any kind to appellant's 
injuries." (p. 8) 
To support this contention, respondent rests solely on the 
affidavit of its attorney, Mr. Stevens (p. 8 and 33; R. 476-484). 
Other than the undocumented attack on the severity of Mrs. Chris-
tiansen's injuries and their effect on her life and earning capa-
city, the point made in Mr. Steven's affidavit, and as argued 
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in respondent's brief at pages 7 and 33, is that a month prior to 
the trial before Judge Dee of the issue of Airport's contractual 
obligation to extend insurance to Holiday, and of Mrs. Christian-
sen's settlement with the Maws, Lingards and Holiday, she had 
offered settlement of her case for $85,000. This, he argues, 
states the upper limit of her own evaluation of her claim. 
The reasons for Mrs. Christiansen, injured, disabled and 
unemployed, making an offer of settlement below the value of her 
case are not in this record, because Mr. Stevens filed his affi-
davit during the course of the last argument before Judge Daniels 
when the record was complete otherwise. They are, though, a mat-
ter of common sense. The amount a jury might award to a single, 
divorced woman in Utah is very unpredictable and what apportion-
ment of fault might a jury make (while Holiday was clearly negli-
gent, there was a question of her comparative negligence)? Holi-
day didn't have the money to pay a substantial judgment (Nielsen 
affidavit R. 365-368), so her only chance of full recovery was 
from Home as insurer of Airport, which would involve additional 
time and uncertainty to litigate the extension of the policy of 
insurance to Holiday so as to cover her claim. 
In that situation, a plaintiff will settle for less than 
a case is worth in order to provide for themselves and their 
family and to have the money in hand. Simply, the realistic 
application of the old axiom that "A bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush." 
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The fact that even under those circumstances, plaintiff 
insisted on at least $85,000, a very substantial sum, would mean 
that she and her counsel's evaluation of her injuries was in a 
far higher figure. This was a discount for cash on the spot. 
It is possible that Home missed the boat and should have 
accepted her offer. 
Finally, Judge Fishier is not a rubber stamp. He would not 
have approved a judgment for $10,000,000. The judgment in his 
eyes even though he accepted appellants1 requests, had to be based 
on sound mathematics and the facts of the matter presented to him. 
While a default judgment does not have the same sanctity as one 
subject to cross-examination, it still has weight and should not 
be ignored. 
The minimizing affidavit of the attorney for the insurance 
company without any kind of documentary support, scarcely stands 
as a factual rebuttal of the validity of the amount of the judg-
ment Mrs. Christiansen obtained from Judge Fisher. 
Also, for respondent to attack the amount of appellants' 
judgment requires some showing of collusion or fraud based on 
proper factual documentation. Respondent has submitted none. 
Mr. Stevens1 affidavit merely confirms that due to the refusal 
of Home to defendant Holiday, it was forced to settle with plain-
tiff. 
The result is this: Mrs. Christiansen's judgment has support 
in the record and respondent's opposition to it does not. 
DID AIRPORT BREACH ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO EXTEND ITS 
LIABILITY INSURANCE TO HOLIDAY, I.E., IS THE HOME INSURANCE 
POLICY IN FORCE COVERING APPELLANTS' CLAIM? 
The entire foundation of Airport's case is that it breached 
its obligation to extend its liability insurance to Holiday. 
The reason is that, with the obligation breached, there is 
no insurance extending to Holiday to cover Mrs. Christiansen's 
judgment. That, in turn, leads to liability based on breach of 
contract to provide insurance, $15,000 (see Resp. Brief pp. 
12-15), rather than an obligation to insure, $246,000 (see App. 
Brief pp. 32-39). Home prefers a $15,000 obligation. 
If, as a matter of fact, Airport honored that commitment, 
the case is over - there is insurance in force covering appel-
lants so that all respondent's arguments of indemnity and breach 
of contract are moot. 
What does respondent say in its brief on the facts relative 
to this point? 
The only specific statement is at page 12 of respondent's 
brief: 
"Under the facts of the case as determined at trial, 
Airport Shuttle entered into a contract with Holiday 
under which it was obligated to procure liability 
insurance. For the purposes of its motion for sum-
mary judgments, Airport Shuttle conceded that it had 
breached this obligation and procured no such insur-
ance, and that had it purchased such insurance, that 
insurance would have extended coverage to plaintiff's 
claimed damages." [Emphasis added.] 
As support for this vital "concession," that Airport 
breached the contract, the only facts submitted are stated 
at page 11 of respondent's brief that (1) the owners of Air-
port Shuttle, Mr. Howell and Mr. Hinckley, did not believe 
they were obligated to provide the insurance and (2) that 
Airport Shuttle's attorney made no representation to the 
court that he believed the Home Insurance policy covered 
Holiday. 
As to the first point, that Airport did not believe it 
was obligated to provide the insurance, that is now ancient 
history, unappealed res judicata, the jury before Judge Dee 
having specifically found that Airport did have that obliga-
tion to extend insurance. (R. 248, App* brief p. 11) 
As Airport says, "Under the facts of this case as deter-
mined at trial, Airport Shuttle entered into a contract with 
Holiday under which it was obligated to procure liability 
insurance." (Resp. Brief p. 12) 
Airport contended for a point - its owners believed they 
had no contractual obligation to extend insurance to Holiday, 
lost before Judge Dee on that very point (App. brief p. 17), 
in 1982, and never appealed. To now raise the point as a 
genuine basis for a present legitimate factual dispute is 
simply an attempt to mislead the court by misstating adjudi-
cated facts. (App. Brief p. 17) 
The second contention, that Airport Shuttle's attorney 
never made any representation to any court that he believed 
the Home Insurance covered Holiday (Resp. Brief p. 11), is 
also unsupported by facts in respondent's brief. It is simply 
a bare assertion• 
Airport in its brief had the opportunity to explain or 
put in a different context its attorney's chamber statements 
to Judge Dee, such as "my clients (Airport) have insurance 
that will cover this agreement (the "insured contract" with 
Holiday)•" (App. brief p. 20, context at pp. 6-11) 
The quotes are there in black and white- Airport simply 
denies them. This fails to raise an issue of fact before this 
court based on evidence. 
The result is that Airport has acknowledged the facts 
asserted by appellants (App. brief pp. 6-11, 20, law at 27-29) 
relating to judicial estoppel of Airport. 
In respondent's statement as to why the contract to extend 
insurance was breached, the key phrase is "had it (Airport) 
purchased such insurance, that insurance would have extended 
coverage to plaintiffs' claimed damages." (Resp. brief p. 12). 
What does Airport mean? The burden of proof to establish 
the fact is on it. How does it prove it didn't purchase the 
insurance? If it did, as it concedes, the insurance is in force. 
As pointed out in appellants' brief, all the steps neces-
sary to prove the insurance was in full force and effect at the 
time of plaintiff's injury were documented. (App. brief pp. 
5-11, 17-18, 30-31) 
Appellants challenged respondent with the obligation of 
coming up with facts, such as nonpayment of premium, the agent 
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overstepping his authority, failure to properly interpret the 
policy of insurance, or such to show that some breach had 
occurred which would keep the insurance from being in force. 
(App. brief pp. 19-20) 
RESPONDENT TOTALLY AND ENTIRELY FAILED TO MEET THAT 
CHALLENGE. It dropped the burden of proof. The closest it 
came is the statement, at page 12 of its brief, "that had it 
purchased such insurance, that insurance would have extended 
coverage to plaintiff's claimed damages," i.e.f we didn't pay 
the premium, i.e. Home is not obligated to insure us against 
plaintiff's or Holiday's claims. 
Had there been any facts at all favoring Airport that 
it had breached by nonpayment of premium, most assuredly re-
spondent would have submitted them to Judge Daniels, and would 
have submitted them to this court for this appeal. 
Airport and Home know perfectly well that the insurance 
was in force, as the initial payment of an additional premium 
was not necessary. (App. Brief pp. 6, 8, 10, 20, 31) 
If not, and this is repetitive but the point has to be 
made, Airport and Home would have submitted chapter and text 
from the insurance policy, the agent or the ledgers, on the 
necessity and amount of the increased premium to cover Holiday; 
when it was due; and that it was not paid. 
None of these contentions are established to the slightest 
degree by Airport. It doesn't even try. It just falsely says 
the premium wasn't paid. Airport's reasons for doing this are 
explained in appellants1 brief at pages 15 to 25. 
The assertion of the fact of nonpayment without support 
leaves the fact unproved, and sustains plaintiff's facts. 
The result is that appellants1 evidence tending to prove 
that all facts necessary to prove the insurance was in force 
are admitted by respondent's failure to rebut. 
IS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM COVERED BY THE HOME INSURANCE POLICY? 
Respondent claims that there is no such coverage. 
While this case was on appeal, Airport, through its attor-
ney, Mr. Stevens, tendered Mrs. Christiansen its check for 
$15,000. This was not an offer of settlement. As his letter 
indicates, this was a payment in full of the $15,000 judgment 
entered by Judge Daniels against Airport based on the amount 
paid by Holiday. (Letter Annex #1) 
A photostat of that check is also annexed. (Annex #2) 
The Payor of that check is Home Insurance Company. 
What is the significance of this check? 
Let us examine this from the position of Home. 
If, as Airport claims, it breached its obligation to have 
the Home insurance in force, then Airport is liable to indem-
nify Holiday. Home is not because the policy is simply not in 
force relative to plaintiff's claim. That means there is no 
duty on Home to pay any claim or settlement to plaintiff or 
Holiday, whether based on liability or indemnity. 
The fact that Home pays plaintiff to protect Airport 
means that its posture before this court can be reconsidered. 
While Home says it is on the sidelines, the fight being 
between Airport and Holiday for failure to make the insurance 
effective, its act of paying indicates that Home operates on 
two levels. On the upper level, for the purpose of litigation 
(Resp. p. 12), Home says it is not involved, not the insurer 
here. On the lower level, it concedes it is the insurer by 
making payment to protect Airport. That is, if Airport has to 
pay, Home will pay. It did. 
This can only be on the basis that Home's position is 
only that, a position, and it knows in fact after it has plead 
Airport into being uninsured, that it cannot abandon Airport 
there. Should it do so, Home's attorney, hired, paid and 
directed by Home, would be in an untenable position of con-
flict of interest as to whose interests he really serves, 
Home's or Airport's. 
Now let us examine this from Airport's position. 
It was totally in Airport's interest when there was a 
jury finding that it had the obligation to extend its insur-
ance to Holiday, and its agent, Mr. Denning, said that it had 
done so, and that the insurance was in force covering Holiday 
for plaintiff's claim, not to make any statement such as, 
"Airport Shuttle conceded that it had breached its obligation 
and procured no such insurance ... ." (Resp. brief p. 12) 
To the contrary, Airport would have told Home to protect 
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and indemnify Airport. 
If Home refused to do so, Airport would have joined Holi-
day in settling with plaintiff and would have assigned its 
policy rights against Home to her as Holiday did. 
In review, these factors lead to what, appellants contend, 
are inescapable conclusions. These are: 
1. Appellants have factually established that the Home 
insurance covers plaintiff's claims. Respondent, Airport, has 
submitted no facts to rebut this before Judge Daniels nor here. 
2. Airport would not have "conceded" that it had breached 
its obligation to extend the insurance to Holiday if Airport 
was speaking for itself. That would leave Airport exposed to 
liability, whether for $15,000 or $246,000. Accordingly, the 
concession was based on the knowledge of the Home - Airport 
attorney, that Airport faced no actual exposure. (See App. 
brief, pp. 15-25) Home uses Airport as a straw man. 
That is, not only within the civil burden of proof, but 
literally beyond a shadow of a doubt, Home knows its insurance 
is in force and is using the courts to delay the enforcement 
of plaintiff's claim until once against she weakens to the 
point where she offers to settle for $85,000, not because of 
the merits of her claim, but because faced with endless liti-
gation and chances of losing, she once again discounts her 
claim. 
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HAS, AND IS, HOME MANIPULATING THE COURTS? 
Appellants refer here to their brief pages 15 to 25 and 
39 to 41. 
Appellants there pointed out the steps taken by Home, 
adverse to Holiday, its indirect insured, and adverse to Air-
port, its direct insured, which appellants claim did in fact 
amount to a manipulation of the judicial system. 
Respondent's brief can be read and reread. Aside from 
rhetoric, there is not a single fact stated in that brief which 
in any way rebuts the argument that it manipulated. This is 
before this court on appeal, and respondent had the duty to 
rebut, or stand at risk by its silence. 
Rather, Home, by its present brief, proves what appel-
lants contended. That is, Home is the real party in interest 
in defense of this case, not Airport. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Christiansen's judgment should be affirmed in amount 
as to Holiday and Airport. The court is requested to find that 
Airport's obligation to extend its liability insurance from 
Home to Holiday was not breached, but was honored. The court 
is requested to find that the Home insurance covers Airport 
and Holiday for plaintiff's claim. The court is requested to 
find that Home is a real party in interest. 
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The court is requested to award appellants' attorney 
fees and costs for this appeal. 
DATED June 18, 198 4. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^SAMUEL K^kG 
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